The Journal of Human Rights

Editorial

Content of Issue 26, The Semi-Annual Journal of Human Rights (Fall 2018 - Winter 2019)

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019

Abstract

Content of Issue 26, The Semi-Annual Journal of Human Rights Read More

Research Article

Religious Violence: Fact or Fiction?

Abolqasem Fanaei

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 3-30

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105169.1096

Abstract

The main question of this article is this. Does religion itself play a role in “political violence”? After clarifying the meaning of relevant terms such as “religion”, ... Read More

Research Article

Peace and Subjectivity

Louis E. Wolcher

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 31-48

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105271.1097

Abstract

So long as there is law there can be no universal human right to peace. This is because legalized violence, whether in threat or in deed, constitutes the very antithesis of peaceful ... Read More So long as there is law there can be no universal human right to peace. This is because legalized violence, whether in threat or in deed, constitutes the very antithesis of peaceful relations from the point of view of those whom law represses. Law cannot define peace as the absence of all violence—and still less as the absence of all legalized suffering—without gainsaying justice, for as Pascal says, “Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical.” Although legal outcomes, like falling boulders and pouncing lions, can always be imputed to historical causes, experience teaches that legal actors generally seek to legitimate their deeds by grounding the law in some non-causal narrative of the right or the good. According to a tenet of political liberalism that can be traced to Descartes’ discovery (or invention) of the irreducible “I” that thinks, the legitimacy of law’s narrative is both given and taken by free and rational politico-legal subjects. In truth, however, the Western philosophical tradition gives us two separate grammars for discussing what it takes to be two different kinds of rational subjects: the causal subject and the grounding subject. The causal subject stands in a relation to the world. Acting strategically as the cause of effects, it uses the object world and other human beings as means to its ends. But the causal subject is also itself caused: its desires and actions are effects of history in the largest sense of the word. Such a one is fated by grammar and custom to become an object and a means in its own right: an object for scientific inquiry and knowledge, for example, and, more generally, a means to the ends of other causal subjects. From the standpoint of the causal subject, there can be no human right not to use or be used as a means. Unlike the causal subject, the grounding subject is supposed to be a genuine origin rather than a mere link in an infinite chain of causes and effects. In Greek terms, this subject is an archē as opposed to an aitia. It also corresponds to the original Latin meaning of the word “sub-ject”: it is thrown (jacere) under (sub) its world as (not in) an unmediated relation to its projects. This second kind of subject has gone by many different names, including “soul” (Plato), “freedom” (Kant) and “Spirit” (Hegel). In one way or another, the idea of the grounding subject performs its primary task within the moral sphere: it is supposed to provide a secure foundation which explains how it is possible for its doppelganger, the causal subject, at once to accomplish something in the world and to refute Plautus’s notorious argument that man is wolf to man. If the causal subject reacts in the manner of an animal, then the grounding subject allegedly responds in the manner of an animal rationale. If the causal subject produces effects, then the grounding subject is supposed to create and bear responsibility for those effects. Given the foregoing distinctions, the most pressing juridical and moral question facing twenty-first century humanity seems to be: How can law and politics become at once effective and just, coercive and compassionate, responsive and responsible? How, in short, is it possible (to borrow Kant’s somewhat quaint terminology) to use oneself and other human beings simultaneously as ends and as means? But here, as elsewhere in philosophy, appearances can be deceiving, for this question presupposes far too much. This paper investigates the strong connection between the foregoing concepts of subjectivity and the notion of a just peace. The question is not, “Are there rational subjects and can they found something new, such as a just peace?” Instead, the question at the heart of the matter is how something as flimsy and ephemeral as an “idea” could ever found anything at all. I will attempt to unmask the terrible tensions or contradictions between justice and ethics, freedom and responsibility, and reason and compassion, and trace them to their origin: the will (or desire) to deny tragedy. I claim that the concept of the grounding subject represents a desperate and ultimately futile attempt to repress awareness of (and evade personal responsibility for) the essential sadness and tragedy of the world. Reason and faith provide the human body with a thin tissue of grounding statements comprised of symbols and images. At best these symbols and images are mere stimuli: action-triggers that will never adequately span the vast existential distance separating the grounding subject from the causal subject, our ends from our means, our words from our deeds, and, more generally, human suffering from the endless secular and religious casuistries we offer to justify it.

Research Article

Religion, Human Rights and the Problem of Organizational Structure

Lawrence Davidson

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 49-64

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105272.1098

Abstract

This paper will seek to present an understanding of the historical conditions that make possible a convergence of the selected religious teachings and human rights, and ask the question ... Read More This paper will seek to present an understanding of the historical conditions that make possible a convergence of the selected religious teachings and human rights, and ask the question if such a convergence can operate successfully within a hierarchal bureaucracy such as found in government or institutional religion. The paper will look at three specific case studies where there has been a convergence of human rights and religion and the resulting struggle to influence the behavior of the state: 1. the example of Christian liberation theology in South America in the 1960s and 70s. 2. The example of the movement Rabbis for Human Rights within the Israeli milieu from its founding in 1988 to the present. 3. The example of CAIR –The Council on American-Islamic Relations– which presently operates in the U.S. Within the teachings of most great religious movements are found principles of behavior that support the concept of universal human rights. However, these principles are overshadowed when the religious teachings are enlisted to the needs of institutions, be they of the state or established religious hierarchies. The needs of institutions and hierarchical bureaucracies do not reflect universal human rights and the principles of behavior that underpin them. Rather, such institutions reflect the particular needs of interest groups and elites. These elites often are able to use ideology (which may be religious in nature) to cause their own special interests to be substituted for a community’s more general needs and interests. As the rules of behavior narrow to accommodate institutional and bureaucratic dictates, universal human rights becomes the cause of minority groups and others on the margin of society seeking to reinterpret and broaden the definitions of what is humane and proper behavior. It is within this struggle to reinterpret rules of behavior along the lines of universal human rights that a convergence between religious teaching and human rights becomes most possible. But once again, this will happen as an alliance of those outside the dominant power structure. The three case studies given above demonstrate how this struggle from the margins has been fought in three contemporary arenas. A reasonable conclusion drawn from this is that supporters of universal human rights seem, ironically, condemned to never to attain the structural power necessary to enforce, on a universal scale, the practice of their principles. For, no such structural power exists that is designed to realize such universal ends. Thus, even on those rare occasions when champions of human rights manage to attain positions of power, they are always restrained, co-opted, or otherwise compromised by the institutional and bureaucratic matrices of power–all of which are typically designed to promote and protect particular, and not universal, interests. Thus, from an historical prospective, those promoting universal human rights, even when allied to or inspired by religious teachings, are condemned to always fight as outsiders. For to move inside is to transform universal principles into special interest dictates.

Research Article

Religion, Rights and Democracy in Europe

Lorenzo Zucca

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 65-84

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105274.1099

Abstract

Europe is a constellation of liberal democracies characterised by the conviction that the public sphere should be strictly secular and should rule out religious arguments from the realm ... Read More

Research Article

The Role of Women in Nation-Building: Rocking the Boat at the Risk of Making it Capsize?

Myra Williamson

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 85-112

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105277.1100

Abstract

I have been in exile for a long time, and I was amazed at the resilience, intelligence, strength and ability of the Afghan women that I met who came from inside the country and around ... Read More I have been in exile for a long time, and I was amazed at the resilience, intelligence, strength and ability of the Afghan women that I met who came from inside the country and around the world. These women, I promise, can rebuild the country with no problem. (Bernard et al, 2008: 150) In this paper I propose to examine the role played by women in post-conflict scenarios, especially with regards to peace-keeping and nation building. I would like to begin with a general statement about the important and equal role of women in society, a principle which is enshrined in both international human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also a principle that is accepted by the major religions, including Islam. The proposed title of the paper takes its inspiration from the following quote: Few policymakers responsible for nation-building would argue against the ultimate goal of establishing equitable, democratic and egalitarian societies in which the human rights of women are respected. Many however, express the fear that pursuing that goal “too soon” may rock the boat, and that in dealing with a boat so shaky that it may capsize anyway, you just can’t take the risk. This paper seeks to determine what role women should play in post-conflict scenarios, without “capsizing the boat”. It questions to what degree women’s involvement must be postponed in order to first “stabilize the situation”. Some would argue that given the various advantages in women’s involvement sooner rather than later, that their involvement ought not to be postponed. The paper will particularly draw upon the involvement of women in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan itself provides examples of the danger and difficulty of promoting women’s involvement in nation-building. For example, as recently as Sunday 29th September 2008 it was reported that an iconic Afghan policewoman, Malalai Kakar, had been shot and killed, and that the Taliban had claimed responsibility for her death. This was not the first instance of a woman in Afghanistan’s post-2001 police force being directly targeted for assassination. The question these incidents raise is whether an emphasis on promoting the participation of women in the Afghani police-force is premature: is this an example of “rocking the boat” or is this all part and parcel of nation-building? The proposed broad outline for the paper is as follows: Introduction and basic premises: The equality of women and the role of women in society: general legal, social and religious principles; Women and nation-building: definitions, general principles, international documents and statistics; Afghanistan: processes and problems – historical context and modern issues; Conclusion: recommendations for Afghanistan in particular and for women in nation-building in a more general sense.

Research Article

The International Human Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: Referring to Foucault to Achieve the Descriptive Moment

Leonard Hammer

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 113-140

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105279.1101

Abstract

Recognising the inherent problems associated with the international human right to freedom of religion or belief, this article proposes an alternative approach to the right. One can ... Read More

Research Article

The Boundaries of Religious Persecution: Refugee Law and the Limits of Permissible Restrictions on Religion

Samuel Cheung

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 141-174

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105282.1102

Abstract

The right to freedom of religion or belief has been well-established in human rights instruments since the inception of the modern era of international law. However, while inner freedom ... Read More The right to freedom of religion or belief has been well-established in human rights instruments since the inception of the modern era of international law. However, while inner freedom of belief has been uncontested, the ability to manifest those beliefs publicly has been made subject to limitations for certain purposes which include public safety and order, health, morality and the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The degree to which such restrictions on religious practice may be permissible under the rubric of international human rights law has been and continues to be under debate. International refugee law has played an important role in safeguarding religious freedom, as persecution for reasons of religion is one of the five grounds enumerated in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. To what degree are restrictions on religious practice permissible and at what point do such restrictions rise to the level of persecution meriting international protection? An examination of the refugee jurisprudence of States adjudicating religion-based claims will help illustrate the nebulous boundaries of the definition of persecution in the context of religious practice and identify some of the factors and trends which influence refugee decision-making. Part I will provide an overview of international refugee law as it relates to religion and describe the Westphalian context under which it was constructed. The modern era of international law was strongly influenced by wars of religion and the principle of cuius regio, eius religio – whose the rule, his the religion – which emphasized respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in religious affairs of the state as essential to international stability. International refugee law, developed largely in response to World War II and the Holocaust, attempts to balance respect for national sovereignty with humanitarian protection concerns by only applying to persons outside their country of origin. Part II will discuss refugee jurisprudence interpreting the point at which religious restrictions constitute a well-founded fear of persecution and highlight issues which form the boundaries of persecution. How does refugee law distinguish discrimination, which does not merit international protection, from persecution? Should refugees be able to avoid the prisoners’ dilemma of either renouncing their identity or beliefs or face persecution and should the imposition of a moral view constitute serious or grave harm? What deference should be given to religious States who advocate a certain religion as an affair of the State, whether through Shari’a or other religious laws? Can persecution be caused by non-State actors or religious extremists and is non-State sectarian violence a matter for refugee law? Part III will reflect on the inextricable links between religion and politics, economics and culture in light of the fact that religion demands practice by adherents and dictates standards of social conduct. It will discuss the relationship between States and religion and consider whether and how international refugee law promotes religious toleration and pluralism.

Research Article

The spiritual crisis: Human Rights and Religion Political Theory of Human Rights

Emanuela Morelli

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 175-192

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105283.1103

Abstract

My intention in this research is to focus on the idea of spiritual crisis in human rights arena. The topic I shall be discussing concerns a basic set of issues dealing with the ... Read More My intention in this research is to focus on the idea of spiritual crisis in human rights arena. The topic I shall be discussing concerns a basic set of issues dealing with the purpose of human rights, their moral foundation and their ultimate metaphysical ground. Simply put I shall be asking whether there is something special in human beings which entitles them to rights. Some arguments such as human agency, dignity and natural law tend to be quite abstract. It could therefore be tempting to assume that the issue, being of not much practical importance, is not relevant. But this would be a rush assumption because determining the foundation of human rights means determining the very legitimacy of human rights themselves in the international arena. I will consider Ignatieff’s pragmatic point of view that can be summed up with a catch phrase: “without the Holocaust no Declaration, because of the Holocaust, no unconditional faith in the Declaration either” and Stackhouse’s religious one developed in Religion and Human Rights: a Theological Apologetic. My purpose is to analyse both Ignatieff’s view, that avoids contentious religious ground for human rights and offers a secular ground designed with the idea of human agency, and Max Stackhouse who, instead, defends the idea of a theological ethic as religious ground for human rights. First of all, through this analysis I aim at pointing out that while on the one hand the respect for our fellow human beings needs a reverential attitude and our commitment to protect our species needs to be sustained by some faith; on the other hand grounding human rights in religion is extremely dangerous and may imply violent clashes between different religious faiths. Secondly, I also aim at criticizing Ignatieff’s view because a defence of human rights as pragmatic instruments on pragmatic grounds seems to be too weak and human rights regime needs moral and metaphysical foundations to be universally recognized and implemented. Thirdly and ultimately, using Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus I aim at showing the unecessity to agree upon a “single foundation”. A single foundation risks to be authoritative, whereas, what a human rights regime relies on is a plural foundations. If we arrive at respecting human rights on a plurality of grounds, then we are making them more broadly acceptable to people. If we publicly defend human rights for a plurality of reasons, we are rightly proving that there is no “proper” metaphysical foundation. A good reason why we do not need to ground human rights in any particular metaphysics can be that they are already grounded in many metaphysics and can already derive sustenance from many sources. Hence, it would be worthwhile and wise to welcome a plurality of nonexclusive claims concerning the ways in which human rights can legitimately be grounded. Human agency, human dignity, equal creation are, for instance, some examples of different foundations that are not mutually exclusive.

Research Article

Human Rights as the Negation of Religious Ethics

Stephen Humphreys

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 193-204

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105285.1104

Abstract

The present paper takes as its moniker an assertion of that theologian-cum-state theorist, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel saw the Reformation as a moment of transition from dogma ... Read More The present paper takes as its moniker an assertion of that theologian-cum-state theorist, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel saw the Reformation as a moment of transition from dogma to reason in religion, concomitant with the establishment of the modern secular state in Europe. This paper will argue that whereas human rights appear as the ethical content or desire of the rational state, they do not offer a simple corollary or complement of religion; indeed they tend to reverse or negate principles that are central to most major religions. The argument is straightforward: I suggest that core religious symbologies of obligation and community—the obligation of one toward another and the community in God—are vacated in human rights. Human rights transform relations of obligation into systems of ownership and debt (I am no longer obliged to you; rather you are indebted to me). They idealise a relation between the state and the individual that is fundamentally hostile to notions of community. The argument proceeds under four headings: first I look at ‘freedom’—drawing on Hegel for the thesis that human rights be read as a vehicle of religious ethics in a secular state. Second, I refer to Freud and Levinas for the sense of the divine expressed through (or manifest in) guilt and ‘obligation’; I contrast briefly the religious expression of these notions with that found in human rights discourse. Third, a section on ‘community’ argues that this is not merely ignored in human rights discourse, it is actively undermined. Finally, I look at the contemporary practice and theory of human rights envisaged as a system of self and sovereignty channelled through ‘law’ and the state. The argument does not assume incompatibility between human rights and religion as matters of personal belief—it does however identify rivalry between the normative directives on behaviour and self-understanding that inform each as a matter of practice.

Research Article

Human Rights and The Common Good in Catholicism The Criteria of Their Theological Foundation

Antonio Parisi

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 205-220

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105286.1105

Abstract

Theologians whose attention is devoted to social considerations know that the Christian picture of salvation carries with it an ethical commitment which goes well beyond the bounds ... Read More

Research Article

Christian Peacemaker Teams: Uniquely Christian Identity Meets Mainstream Peacemaking

Paul J. Yoder

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 221-240

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105288.1106

Abstract

This paper will explore the links between religion and human rights as embodied in the work and mission of the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) and Muslim Peacemaker Teams (MPT). The ... Read More This paper will explore the links between religion and human rights as embodied in the work and mission of the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) and Muslim Peacemaker Teams (MPT). The paper compares models such as those of theorists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in providing a framework in which to understand, critique and build on the work of CPT and MPT. The CPT and MPT groups “get in the way” of violence through placing themselves in conflict situations for the purpose of reducing all forms of violence against civilians. Born out of the “Peace Church” traditions of Christianity in the 1980s, the movement has expanded to spark formation of the less formalized Muslim Peacemaker Team. The two groups now collaborate through shared training exercises and goals. CPT and MPT present a unique example of the integration of religion and human rights. While CPT have worked more extensively and published their experiences more broadly, both groups exemplify the potential synergy of groups who draw on religion in order to advance human rights. As CPT has a more formalized organizational structure, the paper focuses on this group in order to lay out principles from which both operate. As such, the questions of how human rights and religion are interconnected become very clear in the work of CPT. CPT main goal is to reduce violence against civilians through putting themselves in harms way; in addition, CPT also conscientizes the broader public through publishing accounts of their work, particularly on the internet. CPT works to establish networks of faith communities, human rights organizations, etc. to effect macro-level change, even as their most tangible work is very micro-level. CPT and MPT clearly operate out of a profoundly religious foundation. An emphasis on regular spiritual reflection, communal spiritual experience, and public and private prayer underlines this. Some of the groups’ other specific micro-level tactics include civil protest, maintaining a non-evangelical or proselyte identity, avoiding perpetuation of injustices and living out the teachings and examples of peacemaking from the Prophet Mohammed and Jesus. Part of the troubling paradox that necessitates the paper is the degree to which conscientization proves most effective among homogeneous and similar groups. The story of CPT member Tom Fox illustrates this principle. While recent John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health estimates place the number of Iraqi deaths at more than 650,000 since 2003, the abduction and death of Fox in 2005 captured a tremendously disproportionate amount of Western media attention. The obviously discriminatory media and general public attention is something that groups like CPT must both combat and utilize in order to draw attention to and bring change surrounding conflict situations. In so doing, groups like CPT and MPT seek to bridge the barriers that the media and powerful nation-states perpetuate. This paper seeks to take seriously the dignity of both Muslim and Christian efforts.

Research Article

Qutb and Aquinas on Divine Law and the Limits of the State

Lucas Thorpe

Volume 13, Issue 2 , March 2019, Pages 241-256

https://doi.org/10.22096/hr.2019.105289.1107

Abstract

In the first half of this paper I examine the importance of peace as an ideal in the liberal tradition. I begin by tracing the evolution of this ideal through the works of Hobbes, Locke, ... Read More In the first half of this paper I examine the importance of peace as an ideal in the liberal tradition. I begin by tracing the evolution of this ideal through the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, showing how the idea that relations between human beings should not be based upon force lies at the heart of the liberal tradition. Amongst some contemporary liberals, however, especially those influenced by John Rawls, there is a suggestion that liberal peace is only possible between individuals who are willing to make a radical separation between the religious and political domains, assigning religion exclusively to the private domain. In the second half of this paper I question this claim and argue that liberal peace does not necessarily involve the privatization of religion. I believe that such question are better discussed in concrete rather than abstract terms and I so focus on a particular thinker who is clearly against the privatization of religion: Sayyid Qutb. On the surface it might seem that long term peace between secularist liberals and a thinker like Qutb would be impossible, because he seems to be an implacable enemy of liberal democracy. His most radical and influential work, Milestones, was, in part, written as a polemic against those Muslims who believed that the Koran only sanctions defensive Jihad and not offensive Jihad. Qutb argues that Islam offers a universal message and at the heart of this universal faith is a hatred of tyranny. Therefore, Muslims must not just struggle to defend Islamic lands from attack but must fight against tyranny wherever it occurs. And Qutb identifies tyranny with any society where human beings have usurped the God’s sovereignty. Now, in so far as western liberal societies are based on the idea of popular sovereignty and self-determination this might seem to suggest that Qutb is arguing for the legitimacy of Muslims waging violent jihad against western liberal democracies, and this is how he is often read, both by many western liberals and by contemporary Islamic jihadists. I argue, however, that this is a hasty conclusion to draw, for it is clear that Qutb’s primary target was oppressive authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and his views towards western liberal democratic society were far more ambiguous. Firstly, it is not clear that the liberal tradition is really based upon the idea of human sovereignty in the way Qutb rejects it, for this tradition is seeped in the natural law tradition, and there is a strong agreement amongst liberals that a legitimate society is one ruled by law and not the arbitrary will of human beings. Secondly, although Qutb is opposed to the idea of popular sovereignty, he himself seems to offer an analogue of the social contract, for he believes that although all law ultimately comes from God, Islamic law cannot be imposed by force and so that before one can have a society governed by divine law there needs to be an Islamic community, and which can only come into existence through the free submission of its members to the law. Finally, Qutb’s views on hermeneutics also suggest a far more liberal position that is usually attributed to him.

Volume 16 (2021-2022)

Volume 15 (2020-2021)

Volume 14 (2019-2020)

Volume 13 (2018-2019)

Volume 12 (2017-2018)

Volume 11 (2016-2017)

Volume 10 (2015-2016)

Volume 09 (2014-2015)

Volume 08 (2013-2014)

Volume 07 (2012-2013)

Volume 06 (2011-2012)

Volume 05 (2010-2011)

Volume 04 (2009-2010)

Volume 03 (2008-2009)

Volume 02 (2007-2008)

Volume 01 (2006-2007)

Volume & Issue: Volume 13, Issue 2 - Serial Number 26, March 2019, Pages 1-256 (Issue 26)

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