The paper argues that an approach to democracy that combines an anti-foundationalist epistemology and a deliberative political and moral stance will enable us to solve the increasing tensions between the universalistic claims of human rights and the particularistic claims to autonomy coming from different cultural groups.
The anti-foundationalist conception of normative authority I put forth is centered on the distinction between universal grounds for and universal scope of normativity. It maintains that the universalistic normative force of our norms and practices remains uncompromised by the acknowledgment of the ultimate circularity of our justifications, thus eschewing the pitfalls of both foundationalism and relativism.
My main contention is that only by ensuring inclusive and self-reflexive practices of collective decision-making we will be able to address the tensions between universalism and cultural relativism, and produce more flexible models of democratic governance, citizenship and cultural membership suitable to face the challenges of the global processes of integration and differentiation.